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Abstract
Decades of research in Social Psychology have demonstrated that political
intolerance is not displayed equally with respect to ideology. In particular, conservatives
and those with right-wing beliefs are much more likely to display intolerant judgments
than those with liberal or left-wing beliefs. This "prejudice gap" has been found to be so
ubiquitous that it is now the conventional wisdom regarding the relationship between
ideology and intolerance. However, a small, but growing literature challenges this
presumed ideological asymmetry and has instead found that liberals and conservatives
display intolerance under certain circumstances. Synthesizing the recent research
showing ideological symmetry in intolerance judgments, the Ideological-Conflict
Hypothesis (!CH) was developed. This thesis attempts to expand the literature on the ICH

by integrating it with multidimensional models of ideology and the growing literature on
negative emotions. The findings of this analysis support the general assertion made by the
ICH, but also challenges its utility when predicted by multidimensional models of
ideology. Additionally, the analysis shows the crucial role of an understudied emotion in
determining political intolerance: hatred. The analysis thus challenges scholars to better
integrate the findings of the ICH with more complete models of ideology, while
expanding the research of emotional effects on intolerance to include hatred.
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Chapter 1. Introduction
In 2007, Fred Ed words, director of communications for the American Humanist
Association, stated that in America today, "Americans still feel it's acceptable to
discriminate against atheists in ways considered beyond the pale for other groups"
(americanhumanist.org, 2015). To back up his statement, Edwards points to
constitutional provisions across several states of America's "Bible Belt" where atheists
are barred from running for public office (Bulger, 2015). This example of political
intolerance is often described as out-of-touch with American values as the U.S. is
regarded by conventional wisdom as the epitome of a liberal democratic culture
supporting one of the world's most effective and responsive democracies (Stouffer,
1955).
Democratic societies are built on the concept of political tolerance. Members of
democratic societies are not expected to agree with individuals who do not share their
political beliefs, endorse their political objectives, or even like them. However, it is
expected that they put up with them - meaning that individuals tolerate their rights to free
speech, to assembly, and to advocate for their political objectives. Such political
tolerance has been described as the extent to which we extend these and other civil
liberties and rights to groups or individuals with whom we disagree (Marcus, Sullivan,
Theiss-Morse, & Wood, 1995; Sullivan, Marcus, Feldman, & Piereson, 1981).
No matter how much the concept of political tolerance may be a foundation of
democratic societies, it presents a particular conundrum for any democracy. As
individuals mature into adults, they naturally identify with certain groups and cast others
as outgroups. This leaves many open to intolerance. In fact some scholars (e.g. McClosky
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& Brill, 1983; Aboud, 1988; Devine, 1989) have argued that intolerance may be more

"natural" than tolerance, given the ubiquity of slavery and oppression throughout human
history. However, evidence also shows that individuals can be taught tolerance and
convinced it is an important principle (Avery, Bird, Johnstone, Sullivan, & Thalhammer,
1992; Brody, 1994). In addition, several cultural factors moderate political intolerance.
The characteristic of individualism central to American culture encourages separation
from group identity, and American diversity requires interaction with those that are
different from us. Scholars (e.g. Marcus, Sullivan, Theiss-Morse, & Wood, 1995) have
thus described these characteristics as important cultural precursors necessary for the
moderation of political intolerance. However, what about those who identify with a
particular political party or political ideology? Does such moderation exist for individuals
who identify as conservative or liberal?
Throughout the Social Psychology literature, research has supported the argument
that conservatives and individuals with relatively right-wing political beliefs are more
prejudiced toward and politically intolerant of a variety of groups than are liberals and
individuals holding relatively left-wing political beliefs (Sibley & Duckitt, 2008). The
research has concluded that conservatives are much more predisposed than liberals to be
intolerant of groups that go against their worldview, violate their morality, or do not
conform to their values (Farwell & Weiner, 2000). Together, these results have been
referred to as the prejudice gap between liberals and conservatives (Chambers,
Schlenker, & Collisson, 2013). Despite the substantial support for the prejudice gap
(Sibley and Duckitt 2008), a small, but growing body of evidence suggests that the
prejudice gap may be overstated. These scholars (e.g. Brandt, Reyna, Chambers,
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Crawford, & Wetherell, 2014) have challenged the presumed asymmetrical relationship
that conservatism significantly predicts political intolerance whereas liberalism does not,
and have suggested that intolerance may exist across the ideological spectrum under
certain circumstances. To expand and integrate the previous findings on and to present a
more complete picture of ideological intolerance, the Ideological-Conflict Hypothesis
was developed. This hypothesis predicts that conservatives and liberals will be similarly
intolerant against social and political groups whose values and beliefs are inconsistent
with their own (e.g., supporters of abortion rights for conservatives; opponents of
abortion rights for liberals).
In this thesis, the ideological-conflict hypothesis will be tested using a survey
measuring political intolerance. Additionally, this thesis seeks to illuminate the presence
of political intolerance beyond the standard left-right political spectrum. Using several
novel and innovative measures of ideology, the ideological-conflict hypothesis will be
put to the test in order to answer several questions. First among them is whether or not
the predicted findings of the ideological-conflict hypothesis can be replicated. Second is
how the predictions made by the ideological-conflict hypothesis fair against newer, multidimensional models of political ideology. While the hypothesis predicts that liberal and
conservatives will exhibit similar levels of political intolerance in response to questions
with social and political groups that they disagree with, little has been said for individuals
who identify as moderates. In addition, research has suggested that the traditional leftright spectrum may not pick up ideologies characterized by asymmetric beliefs (e.g.
individuals who identify as economically conservative, but socially liberal and viceversa). Thus, it is possible that by studying other orientations such as Libertarianism or
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Communitarianism scholars may learn new insights in how political intolerance relates to
ideologies beyond the traditional spectrum. Finally, this thesis seeks to provide a new
analysis on how intolerance relates to emotion. New studies (e.g. Halperin, CanettiNisim, & Hirsch-Hoefler, 2009) have shown the relevance of negative emotions in
influencing political intolerance, and this study seeks to integrate the research on emotion
with how intolerance exists in contemporary America.
The second chapter of this thesis examines the extant research on political
tolerance, focusing on the predispositions and precursors to intolerance. Additionally, the
chapter seeks to show how this project relates to and fits in with the current scholarly
literature on ideology and emotion. In chapter three, I discuss the methodology, the data
collected, and how it was utilized in this project. In the next chapter, several hypotheses
are proposed relating to the central questions on the ideological-conflict hypothesis and
its relation to political ideology and emotions. The fifth chapter discusses and presents
the results of the quantitative analysis. The chapter will be divided into several sections,
each discussing and testing a set of hypotheses. Lastly, the final chapter will compare and
contrast these results with the extant literature and discuss conclusions that can be drawn
from the findings. The chapter will close with a discussion on what possible future
research is necessary and the theoretical and practical implications of the findings.
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Chapter 2. Literature Review
Political Intolerance: Psychological and Social Context
Political tolerance has been a subject of scholarly inquiry for some time. It is
typically defined as the extent to which political rights and civil liberties are extended to
groups or individuals with whom we disagree (Marcus, Sullivan, Theiss-Morse, & Wood,
1995; Sullivan, Marcus, Feldman, & Piereson, 1981). Given this standard definition,
scholars have examined political intolerance relative to groups that are perceived to have
inconsistent values with a particular society (e.g. atheists in America) or be a threat to
society as a whole (e.g. Communists). Following World War II and McCarthyism in the
1950s, scholars began to ask what psychological and social factors lead to intolerant
beliefs, particularly in the Western World. Over many decades, political scientists and
social psychologists had amassed data on the predispositions, cognitions, habits, and
values of those who display intolerant beliefs and behaviors.
One of the first studies conducted on political intolerance in America was by
Stouffer (1955). Researching political tolerance during the Second Red Scare and with
McCarthyism in full swing, Stouffer analyzed two national samples of the masses and
one sample of community elites to determine the level of tolerance toward communists
and related groups. Stouffer found that the tolerant had several psychological and
demographic factors in common. Particularly, more tolerant individuals had less rigid
personalities, were less authoritarian in nature, and more optimistic. They were also
younger, more educated, more urban and non-churchgoers. Stouffer's seminal work was
the first to show the importance of psychological predispositions and societal factors to
levels of political intolerance. Continuing Stouffer's legacy, other scholars have found
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that predispositions, such as personality, play a vital role in determining levels of
tolerance. Sullivan, Piereson, and Marcus (1982) found that dogmatism, a lack of trust in
people, and a focus on lower-order psychological needs like safety - collectively known
as psychological security - were strongly associated with political intolerance. Although
the construct can be measured differently, other scholars have found similar results:
authoritarian, close-minded individuals generally adopt intolerant judgments and beliefs
toward racial, ethnic, or political groups that differ or disagree significantly with them
(Altemeyer, 1988; Gibson, 1987, 1992; McClosky & Brill, 1983; Nunn et al., 1978;
Sullivan et al., 1982).
The idea that personality influences levels of intolerance is widely held and
studied in the social science literature. Since Stouffer (1955) and others studied
personality's effect on intolerance indirectly -that is, they were more concerned with
levels of intolerance in the general public and the possible causes of such intolerance other scholars during and after Stouffer's research researched personality and prejudice
in a more direct manner. Within the literature, there are several divergent theories and
measures that seek to illuminate how personality influences intolerance and prejudice the Authoritarian Personality Theory, Right-Wing Authoritarianism, Social Dominance
Orientation, and the Dual-Process Motivational (DPM) approach. Each theory and
measure has had a lasting impact on the study of intolerance and each presents
psychological reasons as to why individuals adopt intolerant attitudes. Conceptualized by
Adorno et al. (1950), the theory of the authoritarian personality was developed from the
conclusion that generalized prejudice formed part of an even broader dimension of social
attitudes involving prejudice against out-groups and minorities, glorification of in-group
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behavior, political and economic conservatism, and antidemocratic attitudes. Adorno et
al. argued that this attitudinal dimension was the direct expression of an authoritarian
personality consisting of nine traits as measured by the F Scale. However, research on the
authoritarian personality soon showed that the theory and F Scale were seriously flawed.
Specifically, the F Scale lacked reliability and unidimensionality when controlling for
acquiescent bias, or the tendency for survey respondents to agree with statements
regardless of their content. This was due to the all-positive formulation of the F Scale's
items.
Although the authoritarian personality was shown to be flawed, several reliable
predictors of intolerance were directly derived from the F scale. Altemeyer (1981) found
that three of the original nine surface traits of authoritarianism described by Adorno et al.
( 1950) - conventionalism, authoritarian aggression, and authoritarian submission - did
co-vary strongly enough to form a unidimension of prejudice. Altemeyer therefore
developed the Right-Wing Authoritarianism scale to measure this dimension. Subsequent
research (Altemeyer, 1981, 1988, 1996, 1998) showed that the RWA scale was a
unidimensional and reliable psychometric measure. Later, Sidanius and Pratto (1999;
Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 1994) proposed another individual-difference
dimension, the Social Dominance Orientation, as a direct trait on prejudice. Both of these
two dimensions have been shown to be reliable and powerful metrics for measuring
general prejudice (Altemeyer, 1998).
Another model of prejudice - the Dual-Process Motivation approach - suggests
that SDO and R WA are not personality traits, but rather two basic dimensions of social or
ideological attitudes that express independent motivational goals for or values of group-
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based dominance and superiority (in the case of SDO) and social cohesion and collective
security (in the case of R WA) (Duckitt, 2001; Duckitt, Wagner, du Plessis, & Birum,
2002). According to the DPM approach, the motivational goal or value of social cohesion
and collective security (expressed in RWA) is made noticeable by the belief that the
social world is an inherently dangerous and threatening place (as opposed to being a safe
and secure place), and the predisposing personality dimension is that of social
conformity. This personality dimension causes individuals to identify with the existing
social order and be more sensitive to threats to it. They value order and stability, which in
tum heightens the motivational goal or values of collective cohesion and security
expressed in high RWA. The motivational goal or value of group-based dominance and
superiority (expressed in SDO), in contrast, arises from the underlying personality
dimensions of tough-mindedness and tender-mindedness. People high in toughmindedness are more likely to view the world as ruthlessly competitive in which the
strong win and the weak lose. This makes noticeable the motivational goals or values of
power, dominance, and intergroup superiority expressed in high SDO. This model
therefore sees SDO and RWA as social or ideological attitudes that mediate the effects of
the two personality dimension of social conformity versus tough-mindedness on
prejudice. In contrast to the more traditional approach, which saw personality as having
direct effects on prejudice, this approach sees the effects of personality on prejudice as
being primarily indirect. Whether there is an authoritarian personality that has a direct
effect on prejudice or a more indirect dual-process motivational approach, the literature
has consistently held that personality is the predominate psychological trait that outlines
intolerance and prejudice.
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Education is strongly associated with levels of political tolerance. Second only to
personality, education and to a lesser extent, political expertise, gives individuals greater
acquaintance to broad democratic principles in society (Prothro and Grigg, 1960). For
Prothro and Grigg (1960), education about democratic principles, or the lack thereof,
helped to logically connect abstract democratic principles to real life situations. Once a
formal education ceased the decision to be intolerant or not functions as a standing
decision. McClosky (1964) agreed with Prothro and Grigg's assumption that a formal
education is required for political tolerance to occur. McClosky felt that democratic
beliefs and values, including political tolerance, were unlikely to exist in nature. It is a
heavy burden for individuals to comply with democratic principles. McClosky saw that
individuals needed to acquire extraordinary forbearance, self-discipline, and willingness
to suffer opinions and groups regarded as offensive in order for political tolerance to
occur. Only "articulates" with formal educations like political elites, who have the
required experience, knowledge and temperament to tolerate groups or individuals unlike
themselves, would exhibit strong support for democratic principles and their application
to tolerance (McClosky, 1964).
Education was also found to be the primary reason behind the increase in political
tolerance in the replication of Stouffer's (1955) study by Nunn, Crockett, and Williams
(1978). In Stouffer's (1955) study, individuals were more likely to answer that
Communists needed be found even if that meant hurting or violating the rights of
innocent people. 20 years later, Nunn, Crockett, and Williams found that those who
would rather protect the rights of innocent people (34% in Stouffer's study in 1955)
increased by nearly 40% in 1973 to 70% of the public opting to protect the rights of
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innocent people. Nunn, Crockett, and Williams explained this increase by suggesting that
increases in the number of individuals with higher educations created more tolerant
standing decisions. However, others (e.g. Marcus, Sullivan, Theiss-Morse, & Wood,
1995) suggest that it is possible that in combination with higher education levels, the
information that would later discredit much of the Communist hunts in the 1950s could
have played a valuable role in the increase in tolerant beliefs toward Communists.
Although much evidence points to the role education plays in determining levels of
political tolerance, the role of education has not been without its critics.
Despite the evidence showing that education is a good predictor of political
tolerance, some scholars have questioned its direct effects. Beginning in 1979, a group of
scholars - headed by Sullivan, Piereson, and Marcus - challenged the concept that the
American public had become more politically tolerant. Using the least-liked group
measure, a then-novel conceptualization of political tolerance as "putting up with" the
expression of a group (the act) rather than the group itself (the actor), Sullivan, Piereson,
and Marcus (1979, 1982) showed that the American people did not become more tolerant
during the 1970s than during the 1950s as Nunn et al. (1978) suggested, but rather
Americans became less hostile toward the actor/group (e.g. Communists) and just as
intolerant toward the act (e.g. speech, assembly, etc.). Although, this research challenged
the primary cause and effect (education and more tolerance, respectively) found by Nunn
et al. (1978), Sullivan, Piereson, and Marcus (1979, 1982) did not reject the notion that
education as a predisposition has an effect on levels of tolerance. Rather, they suggested
that education interacted with other variables - such as support for democratic principles
- to influence tolerance levels.
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Just as personality and education have been found to be two of the primary
predispositions influencing tolerance levels, so too are standing decisions. Research has
shown that the support for the general principles of democracy is widespread among
Americans and important to tolerance judgments (McClosky & Brill, 1983; Prothro &
Grigg, 1960; Sullivan, Piereson, & Marcus, 1982; Sullivan, Shamir, Walsh, & Roberts,
1985). However, when such general support is applied to specific situations or groups,
that consensus breaks down. For example, Prothro and Grigg (1960) found that 90% of
Americans supported the concept of minority rights, but when that principle is applied to
Communists, the support breaks down. One way to explain this apparent paradox is that
individuals rely on standing decision rather than making continuous reassessments.
McClosky and Brill (1983) discuss the idea that for psychological and sociological
reasons individuals settle ,upon social norms. By settling on social norms, individuals can
avoid the psychological pain of continuous conflict and disagreement, and thus have
stability and predictability in social and political life. This argument also explains why so
many opt for intolerance in concrete situations. It is because individuals "distrust what
they do not understand or cannot control" (McClosky & Brill, 1983: 13-14). Thus the
standing decision for many citizens is one of general support for democratic norms
coupled with a more specific intolerance.
From the discussion here of the psychological and social underpinnings of
political intolerance and prejudice, several conclusions can be drawn. First and foremost,
the primary psychological element that determines levels of intolerance is personality.
Whether it be authoritarian, close-minded individuals that demonstrate right-wing
authoritarianism or a social dominance orientation or a highly educated articulate,
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personality factors as a formidable source of tolerance. Second to personality, education
acts on levels of intolerance by providing individuals with theoretical knowledge on
democratic principles that can be applied in real life situations such as when to be tolerant
toward an out-group. Just as education educates individuals on democratic norms,
standing decisions provide the backdrop in which individuals can rely instead of making
continuing assessments. For articulates and non-articulates alike, the common standing
decision for many is one of general support for democratic norms coupled with a more
specific intolerance. Each of these psychological and social factors contribute to an
individual's level of tolerance and provides a basis for which political ideology and
beliefs can either foster or restrict political intolerance.
Political Ideology
The concept of political ideology, the idea that political opinions and attitudes are
linked together in a coherent system, has been theorized in many different ways and
forms. As laid out by the authors of The American Voter, political ideology consists of a
set of interconnected and stable beliefs that describe an individual's general political
worldview (Campbell et al., 1960). Building on the findings of The American Voter,
Converse (1964) considered ideology as a type of belief system, which is any
configuration of ideas or attitudes that are bound together in a form of interdependence.
Converse argued that in political belief systems some attitudes are held more strongly and
the number of political attitudes held varies. Converse used the concept of constraint to
tie these characteristics together and identify ideological thinking. Constraint is
conceptualized as how attitudes are linked and interdependent, such that holding one
belief should be accompanied by holding another belief. For example, an individual who
supports increased spending for education should also favor more spending for health
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care because both attitudes indicate a liberal belief in an enhanced role for government.
Thus, ideological individuals hold some centrally important beliefs that are connected to
other attitudes in a wide-ranging system.
The primary finding from Converse's work is that the American public is largely
nonideological. Converse found that the American public does not conceptualize politics
in ideological terms as people do not mention ideology in their evaluations and opinions
on politics, but are more apt to use social groups or candidates as their reference. Second,
Converse found that the public was generally unable to recognize the ideological
orientations of political candidates and parties. Finally, Converse found that the public's
opinions were not correlated in a way as to indicate ideological constraint. Thus, for
Converse, no matter how the question was framed, the consistent and constant answer
'l•

was that the vast majority of the public lacked any form of ideological belief system or
thinking.
Following Converse's (1964) findings as reported in "The Nature of Belief
Systems in Mass Publics," many took it to be the conventional way to think about
ideology. However, other scholars began to introduce other theories in a way to challenge
the concept of a nonideological and unsophisticated public. According to Nie et al.
(1976), the political context in the United States must be considered. Converse performed
his study during the 1950s, when ideological thinking was at an all-time low. But as the
political context changed - primarily from a large degree of policy agreement among
parties in the 1950s to more significant divisions in the 1960s and 70s - levels of
ideological constraint increased. Additionally, Abramowitz (2010) expands on this theory
by suggesting that recent years have produced a rapid increase in ideological thinking
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among the public. Using the 2008 American National Election Survey, Abramowitz
found a majority of voters were located at opposite sides on issues, rather than in the
center. Additionally, opinions on these issues tended to be closely connected. Using
climate change as an example, Abramowitz found evidence for the type of ideological
constraint Converse sought, but did not find in his original study.
Further opposing Converse's findings, Lane (1962) used interviews with a small
number of working-class men in one neighborhood to challenge Converse's view of
ideology. Lane criticized Converse for leaving out personality and social structure. Lane
found that his sample did have a form of ideological thinking, but their ideology is not
constrained by the standard liberal-conservative ideological framework that characterizes
elites. Rather, ideology in the public is constrained by how people think of themselves
and society. This ideology includes ideas about who should rule, moral codes, and
fundamental personal values, as well as attitudes toward equality, freedom, and
democracy. Although Lane (1962) introduced a new concept on the structure of ideology,
Lane's findings were criticized as not generalizable to the wider population due to his
small, nomandom, specialized sample.
A third alternative to Converse's approach to ideology was presented by Achen
(1975). Approaching Converse's findings from a statistical point of view, Achen argued
that individuals hold unstable political opinions and attitudes that seem to fluctuate not
because they have no political opinions or because their opinions are only weakly
connected to one another, but because of the nature of survey questions. Achen
developed a model designed to divide ideological constraint into two different sources:
the instability of voter's attitudes and the low reliability of survey questions. Achen
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wanted to show that vague and changing survey questions were mainly to blame for the
instability of public attitudes. When the error was corrected in the analysis, Achen found
stronger levels of stability between individual attitudes and attitude constraint increased.
Ansolabehere et al. (2008) extended Achen's work by applying well-known reliability
estimation procedures to the observed correlations ofrespondents' issue preferences,
demonstrating that once the observed measures are corrected for unreliability,
preferences are not only highly stable and tightly constrained, but affect voting choices to
the same degree as party identification.
Nearly 50 years after Converse's (1964) work, the debate over ideological
thinking is not settled. Some research suggests that average Americans are in fact
ideological in their politics (Layman & Carsey, 2002; Jost, 2006; & Abramowitz &
Saunders, 2008). Others continue to present evidence that the public is nonideological
(Feldman, 2003; Bishop, 2005; Kinder, 2006). Some have attributed the recent
polarization in the public to increasingly polarized elites (Fiorina et al., 2010). Converse
himself acknowledged that changes in American politics and the public may have
ushered in a more substantial role for ideology in the American electorate, but he argues
that the larger picture remains unchanged (Converse, 2006). Many of the critiques and
alternative theories did not directly refute Converse's findings, but simply tried to
reinterpret them.
Political ideology has often been conceived in terms of a single left-right
dimension. Since 1972, the American National Elections Study has explicitly asked
respondents to place themselves on a seven-point ideological scale ranging from very
liberal to very conservative. Like Converse (1964), who tested whether individuals
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understood and used these ideological labels, the ANES intends this question to measure
the ideological orientation and strength of individuals. Scholars have argued, though, that
the traditional left-right spectrum carries implicit problems. Ellis and Stimson (2009,
2012) argued that ideology has two components: operational and symbolic aspects.
Symbolic ideology captures the ideological label individuals prefer to use in describing
themselves. Operational ideology, by contrast, is the actual range of political attitudes
and issue positions that individuals hold. Ellis and Stimson present evidence that
although the public tends to be symbolically conservative, it is simultaneously
operationally liberal. If individuals can hold conservative and liberal positions
simultaneously, then this presents a problem with the traditional way ideology is
measured. Traditionally, the left-right, or liberal-conservative, dimension provides a
measure of an individual's preferences concerning social change versus economic
intervention. Some scholars (e.g. Saucier, 2000; Layman & Carsey, 2002) have
conceptualized ideology of consisting of two separate dimensions. One is an economic
dimension that relates to governmental intervention in the economy and includes issues
such as progressive taxation, government spending, and redistribution policies. The other
is a social dimension that relates to attitudes toward traditional moral and cultural values
and focuses on issues like abortion, same-sex marriage, and the role of religion in public
affairs. Others have gone further and argued that these dimensions are theoretically
distinct and empirically only weakly related to one another, making it possible to be
socially conservative, but economically liberal, or vice versa (Jost et al., 2009).
Additionally, work by Carmines et al. (2012a, b) presents a typology that shows
five different ideological groups: liberals, conservatives, moderates, libertarians, and
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populists. Liberals are those individuals who support redistribution and governmental
spending on social services while opposing traditionally moralist positions on social and
cultural issues. Conservatives are the mirror image of liberals. They oppose redistribution
policies and want to limit governmental size and spending. They tend to be more
religious and supportive of policies that maintain traditional social mores. Adding to the
tradition liberal-conservative divide, Libertarians are individuals who hold conservative
views on the economic dimension but liberal views on the social dimension. They favor
limited governmental interference in the lives of individuals across all domains of policy.
Libertarians oppose an expansion of governmental spending and interference in the
economy. They also oppose limitations on same-sex marriage and access to abortion.
Populists have conservative social views but liberal economic views. Although they are
proponents of traditionally moralist policy positions, they also value the increased
services that result from a large, activist government. They support limitations on
abortions and same-sex marriage while also approving of redistribution policies and
governmental spending on social services like Social Security and Medicare. What can be
concluded from the extant work on ideological dimensionality is that political ideology is
not as clear cut as it may seem.
Political Affect and Political Intolerance
The role of affect or emotion in politics and political behavior has garnered a
surge of attention in political psychology. Psychology has produced a number of affective
theories (e.g. Lazarus, 1991; Russell, 1980; Watson & Tellegen, 1985), but few of these
theoretical perspectives have helped to explain political attitudes and behavior (Marcus,
2003). Most affective theories sufficiently explain attitudes and behavior in general, but
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fail to adequately explain political attitudes and behavior in particular (Abelson et al.,
1982; Marcus, 1988; Marcus & MacKuen, 1993; Marcus et al., 1995, 2000). Thus,
political psychologists have come to the conclusion that emotions function differently in
politics. Political Psychologists argue that theories of affect developed in the fields of
clinical and social psychology do not adequately explain political attitudes (Marcus et al.,
2000).
Affective Intelligence Theory
One of the most influential theories on the role of emotions in politics is Affective
Intelligence Theory. Developed by political scientists George Marcus, W. Russell
Neuman, and Michael MacKuen, the Affective Intelligence Model posits a dual systems
approach to explain political attitudes and behavior. This approach takes a unique
perspective in that it emphasizes affect - not cognition - as the underlying determinant of
political attitudes and behavior. According to the Affective Intelligence Model, two
subsystems of the brain - the behavioral approach system and the behavioral inhibition
system- govern attitudes and behavior either through (1) the enactment of behaviors
based on procedural norms, or (2) by altering routine behaviors to account for an anxietyinducing threat. The chief hypothesis of the Affective Intelligence model is that when a
threat is introduced, it raises anxiety levels which then causes individuals to seek out
information about the source of the threat (be it a political issue, political candidate, etc.).
As a result, Marcus et al. argue that when anxiety levels are raised, adherence to
previously held political attitudes diminishes, leaving individuals vulnerable to
persuasive messages that they would otherwise not consider (Marcus et al., 2000).
Consequently, a linear relationship between induced anxiety and both attitudinal and
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behavioral outcomes is hypothesized. Thus, the Affective Intelligence model does not
differentiate between individuals of varying cognitive abilities or psychological traits.
Rather, it identifies anxiety as a causal force leading individuals to seek out new
information and figuratively scratch their anxiety-induced itch.
While anxiety is the predominate emotion for Affective Intelligence Theory,
Marcus et al. updated their work to reflect the new knowledge on the biological and
psychological foundations of emotions. Specifically, the initial focus for the model was
primarily on two dimensions, an anxiety dimension and an enthusiasm dimension
(Marcus & MacKuen, 1993; Marcus, 1988). Following work done in the late 1990s and
early 2000s, researchers took note of a third dimension, anger (Huddy et al., 2007; Lerner
& Keltner, 2001; Marcus et al., 2000; Panksepp, 1998). Subsequently, the affective

intelligence model evolved to include this third dimension (MacKuen, Wolak, Keele, &
Marcus, 2010; Marcus et al., 2000; Marcus, 2002). Based on these three dimensions, the
affective intelligence model generates hypotheses specific to each emotion. Hypotheses
on enthusiasm are about when people become engaged in politics in various ways and
their extant identifications and convictions (Brader, 2006; Marcus et al., 2000). Anxiety
is about attention, learning, and reliance on current considerations (Brader, 2006;
MacKuen, Marcus, Neuman, & Keele, 2007; Marcus & MacKuen, 1993). Hypotheses on
anger are about the role of normative violations, and defensive or aggressive actions to
protect their identifications and convictions (Huddy et al., 2007; MacKuen et al., 2010).
Role of Negative Emotions on Political Intolerance
Negative emotions are central to the human experience. We all experience anger,
fear, and hatred. Yet, the examination of negative emotions as antecedents of political
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tolerance has largely gone ignored. To date, most studies on antecedents of political
tolerance have examined the levels of perceived threat (Stephan & Stephan, 2001 ),
ideologies, values, and democratic principles (Sullivan, Piereson, & Marcus, 1982),
personal characteristics like authoritarianism (Duckitt, 1993) or locus of control
(Halperin, Canetti-Nisim, & Pedahzur, 2007), socioeconomic status (Quillian, 1995) or
religious beliefs (Eisenstein, 2006) as the main antecedents of political intolerance.
However, in recent years researchers (e.g. Halperin, Canetti-Nisim, & Hirsch-Hoefler,
2009) have begun to examine the role of negative emotions on political tolerance.
In the literature, several negative emotions have been extensively examined for
their role in political phenomena, albeit not political intolerance. Fear is the most studied
negative emotion. Along with its close cousin anxiety - which is often used
interchangeably with fear - the scholarly attention to the emotion is due to its central role
in human nature. Fear is an aversive emotion which arises in situations of perceived
threat or danger and (Gray, 1987). The feeling of fear calls attention to the threat,
prompts an individual to seek out information on the threat, and if doable remove the
threat - or at least remove themselves from the danger. The role of fear in politics has
been shown to have spillover effects into the voting booth and political information
processing. For example, negative campaign advertising with ominous music or violent
images generate anxiety and fear which in tum affects voting decisions (Brader, 2006).
The role of fear on intolerance is more nuanced. Research as shown that fear typically
does not have a direct relationship to intolerance (Capelos & Van Troost, 2007), but does
have an effect on intolerance through the mediation of variables such as perceived threat
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outgroup derogation or democratic principles (Gibson & Bingham, 1982; Marcus et al.,
1995; Skitka et al., 2004).
Similar to the feeling of fear is that of anger. While people clearly experience
anger as a distinct emotion from fear, dimensional models of emotion tend to have
difficulties separating anger from fear. Because self-reported feelings of anger tend to
accompany fear, researchers tend to place them in close proximity (Tellegen et al., 1999a,
1999b). Nevertheless, four antecedents have been found to distinctly invoke feelings of
anger, beyond the presence of threats and obstacles: (1) an external cause such as
someone who can be blamed (Lazarus, 1991; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985); (2) coping
potential, or the perception that one can control a situation (Carver, 2004; Frijda, 1986;
Lazarus, 1991); (3) the perception that the situation is unfair or undeserved (Averill,
1983; Roseman, 1991); and (4) the familiarity of a threat (Marcus, 2002). Each can cause
anger in isolation or in combination. As in the case of fear, empirical studies do not point
to a direct relationship between anger and intolerance (Skitka et al., 2004).
Hatred is a relatively new studied emotion. Hatred can be defined as the most
destructive affective phenomenon in the history of human nature (Royzman, McCauley &
Rozin, 2005). This is particularly true when examining its effects on intergroup relations.
Hatred can reduce support for efforts to compromise on long-term conflicts (e.g. the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict), induces support for aggressive actions toward outgroups, and
impel people to engage in massacres and wars (Halperin, 2011; Halperin et al., 2011;
Maoz & McCauley, 2005; Maoz & McCauley, 2008; Staub, 2005). Hatred tends to come
in two related, but distinct forms: chronic and immediate (Bartlett, 2005; Halperin,
Canetti, & Kimhi, 2012; Sternberg, 2003). Chronic hatred is a sentimental, stable, and
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familiar "hating" emotional sentiment. Immediate hatred is an emotional, powerful, and
"burning" hate, which often occurs in response to significant events. Chronic hatred tends
to be the more cognitive of the two. It is a deep hatred and involves a rejection of all
members of an out-group. Immediate hatred is more severe and extreme. It is typically
developed in response to a severe and significant offense toward the in-group, which in
turn leads to a total rejection of the out-group. It provokes a strong desire for revenge, a
wish to inflict suffering, and, at times, desired annihilation of the out-group. (Halperin,
Canetti, & Kimhi, 2012). Unlike fear or anger, which targets specific actions, hatred
targets at the fundamental characteristics of the individual or the group (Ben-Zeev, 1992;
Ortony et al., 1988). However, research has shown that because anger is evoked in
response to events that individuals perceive as unjust or unfair, it can become hatred
(Averill, 1982; Halperin, Canetti-Nisim, & Hirsch-Hoefler, 2009). Hatred is often
provoked as a result of recurrent offenses perceived as intentional. Thus, studies on links
between emotions have often assumed that anger can and will become hatred.
Due to the limited number of studies on hatred and political intolerance, no
conclusion can be reached on its political effects. However, preliminary results from one
study directly measuring the role of hatred on intolerance in Israel found that hatred was
a powerful antecedent on intolerance, even when fear, anger, and threat perception are
controlled for (Halperin, Canetti-Nisim, & Hirsch-Hoefler, 2009). Therefore, it is likely
that hatred will need to play a central role in future research on the emotional antecedents
of political intolerance, not just in countries with prolonged conflicts (e.g. Israel), but also
western countries where conflict is less common.

23
The Ideological-Conflict Hypothesis
Since Stouffer's (1955) study on intolerance, researchers have come to find that a
number of psychological and sociological predispositions influence whether or not an
individual will resort to intolerant judgements. Throughout the literature, there is
substantial support for a prejudice gap between liberals and conservatives (Chambers,
Schlenker, & Collisson, 2013). Specifically, the findings on the prejudice gap have
concluded that conservatives and individuals with right-wing orientations are more likely
to be prejudiced toward and intolerant of a variety of social groups in contrast to liberals
and individuals with left-wing orientations (Sibley & Duckitt, 2008). The increased
prejudice and intolerance displayed by conservatives has been attributed to a variety of
psychological factors, including being less intellectually sophisticated and more closeminded (Hodson & Busseri, 2012; Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003; Sibley &
Duckitt, 2008). Despite the substantial support for the prejudice gap, researchers (e.g.
Brandt et al., 2014) have begun to challenge the presumed relationship between ideology
and intolerance. This challenge suggests that the prejudice gap may be overstated. For
example, recent research has found that liberals and conservatives make negative
attributions toward groups whose values are inconsistent with their own (Morgan,
Mullen, & Skitka, 201 O; Skitka, Mullen, Griffin, Hutchinson, & Chamberlin, 2002) and
distance themselves from people who do not share their moral convictions (Skitka,
Bauman, & Sargis, 2005). Furthermore, new research using a variety of samples and
methods has revealed that both liberals and conservatives express intolerance toward
groups with whom they disagree (Chambers, Schlenker, & Collisson, 2013; Crawford,
2014; Crawford & Pilanski, 2014a, b; Lambert & Chasteen, 1997; McClosky & Chong,
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1985; Wetherell, Brandt, & Reyna, 2013; Yancey 2010). It is research like these that have
challenged the relationship between ideology and intolerance and have suggested that
intolerance can exist across the ideological spectrum given the right circumstances. To
organize and integrate these findings into a coherent picture, Brandt et al. (2014)
developed the ideological-conflict hypothesis. This hypothesis predicts that conservatives
and liberals will be similarly intolerant against social groups whose values and beliefs are
inconsistent with their own. In addition, the ideological-conflict hypothesis posits that
both liberals and conservatives dislike ideas that conflict with their own and, thus, engage
in a variety of strategies to maintain their worldview. In this thesis, the hypothesis will be
tested and expanded using multidimensional models of ideology and integrated with
theories of affect to better illustrate the psychological and political dimensions of
intolerance in contemporary America.
Ideology and Intolerance: The Disagreement
In recent years, some political scientists and social psychologists have challenged
the findings of the political intolerance and ideology literature. One perspective maintains
that political conservativism significantly predicts intolerance and liberalism does not

(ideological asymmetry). For example, Lindner and Nosek (2009) found evidence of
ideological asymmetry: specifically, conservatism predicted political intolerance of antiAmerican speech, but liberalism did not predict political intolerance of anti-Arab speech.
Others maintain that conservativism and liberalism significantly predict political
intolerance given the right circumstances (ideological symmetry). For example, Crawford
and Pilanski (2014b) found evidence of ideological symmetry: conservatism predicted
intolerance ofleft-wing targets, whereas liberalism predicted intolerance ofright-wing
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targets. This disagreement stems from several areas of contention, most notably the way
to adequately measure political intolerance and ideology.
This disagreement can be clearly seen in the recent back-and-forth between
scholars studying political intolerance. One group of scholars (e.g. Linder and Nosek,
2009) claim that the conservatism still predicts intolerance more than liberalism does.
They back up this claim with a recent analysis showing just that. However, other scholars
(e.g. Crawford and Pilanski, 2014b) have shown that previous works are
methodologically flawed and provided evidence that liberalism and conservatism predict
intolerance equally. Each group maintains that evidence backs their specific claims on
ideology and intolerance, but it is clear that further work is still needed.
Other research has found inconsistent findings related to the interaction between
political ideology and intolerance. Even though the results found by Crawford and
Pilanski (2014b) are inconsistent with Lindner and Nosek's (2009), as well as other
evidence of ideological asymmetry in the literature (Davis & Silver, 2004; Sniderman,
Tetlock, Glaser, Green, & Hout, 1989), they are consistent with evidence of ideological
symmetry in political intolerance judgments (Chambers, Schlenker, & Collisson, 2013;
Suedfeld, Steel, & Schmidt, 1994; Wetherell, Brandt, & Reyna, 2013). Further research is
thus necessary to illuminate better methods of measuring political intolerance and settle
the disagreement about political ideology and intolerance.
Bias in Social Psychological Research
The central postulate of the ideological-conflict hypothesis is that the extant
research on the relationship between political ideology and political intolerance is flawed.
Specifically, the methodological, survey, and experimental approaches used in the past

26
research has been biased in favor of liberals and biased against conservatives. In other
words, social psychologists and political scientists have, either wittingly or unwittingly,
framed survey questions or used methods that showed liberals are less likely to be
intolerant than their conservative counterparts. Such alleged bias is not new, as science
has been shown to not always be self-correcting (Ioannidis, 2012; MacCoun, 1998;
Nickerson, 1998). Indeed, the allegations that political and social psychology are biased
in favor of liberals has been recognized for some time, but have gone largely ignored
(MacCoun, 1998; Redding, 2001; Tetlock, 1994).
Research on bias in social and political psychology has been pursued on several
fronts. Among the first questions needed to be answered was are the ideological leanings
of social psychologists biased in favor of liberals. This line of questioning has gone
largely unexamined with only one study attempting to quantify the ideological leanings
of social psychologists. With a sample size of 193 9 from the Society of Personality and
Social Psychology, Inbar and Lammers (2012) found that 85.2% of the participants
identified their overall ideology as liberal and 6.2% as conservative. Breaking down the
numbers by issues, 90.6% identified as liberal on social issues compared to 3.9% as
conservatives; 63 .2% as liberal on economic issues compared to 17 .9% as conservative;
and 68.6% as liberal on foreign policy issues compared to 10.3% as conservative.
Furthermore, evidence suggested that the ideological disproportion is increasing: whereas
10% of faculty identified as conservative, only 2% of graduate and postdoc fellows did
so. Although the limitations (e.g. combining "soinewhat liberal" with "liberal") to this
study do limit its generalizability, the results do point to a field of research dominated by
liberals.
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The causes of such disproportion in social psychology has been theorized. Some
researchers have found that people on the left may be more attracted to careers in social
psychology than those on the right (Duarte, Crawford, Stem, Haidt, Jussim, & Tetlock,
2014). Others have attributed the disproportion to more nefarious biases. Multiple studies
have found that humans privilege information that comports well with their pre-existing
beliefs, preferences, attitudes, and morals (Kunda, 1990; Nickerson, 1998; Stanovich,
West, & Toplak, 2013). These biases/processes include confirmation bias, myside bias,
and motivated reasoning. Thus, scientists are not immune to the various forms of
confirmation bias, including political ones (Eagly, 1995; Lilienfield, 2010). Another more
malicious process found to be at least partially responsible for the disproportion is the
creation of majoritarian political and theoretical norms. Specifically, ideological
homogeneity, like that seen in social psychology, can alone produce strong liberal norms
which give rise to felt pressures to conform to liberal views, a reluctance to express nonliberal views, and even the inclination to derogate and punish psychologists who express
conservative views (Festinger, Schachter, & Back, 1950; Miller & Morrison, 2009;
Prentice, 2012; Schachter, 1951). Empirically, the Inbar and Lammers (2012) study
provides evidence of this potential hostile climate. When asked to state their willingness
to discriminate against conservative colleagues in symposia invitations, grant funding,
publication acceptance, and hiring, the authors found that those declaring some
willingness was at 56%, 78%, 75%, and 78% respectively. This relatively high
endorsement of discrimination against conservative colleagues shows support for the idea
that liberals do engage in discriminatory behavior, as predicted by the ideological-conflict
hypothesis.
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Chapter 3. Methodology
In order to ascertain the relationship between political intolerance, ideology, and
emotion, a survey was designed, implemented, and analyzed. Following IRB approval, a
random sample of undergraduate and graduate students were sent emails asking for their
participation in a study on political ideologyi. In order to reduce response bias, the
participants were not told that the primary goal of the survey was to measure levels of
political intolerance. This deception was necessary as to prevent the aforementioned
response bias as well as the social desirability of people wanting to appear tolerant. Given
that the survey's respondents were college students (Mage= 25.90, SD= 8.7l)i\ the
sample likely has homogeneity in age and political ideology (i.e. respondents are more
likely to be young and politically liberal), as college students are more likely to have
these features. Therefore a defense of using college students as an experimental sample is
justified.
David Sears (1986) once described the use of college students in social
psychology research as a "narrow database," i.e. there are problems with internal and
external validity when using college students as a sample. Indeed Political Science as a
discipline has become skeptical of the validity of lab studies using college students
(Bartels, 1993; Benz & Meier, 2006; Gerber & Green, 2008; Jacoby, 2000; Kam et al.,
2007; Lijphart, 1971; McGraw & Hoekstra, 1994; Sears, 1986). Additionally, researchers
(Druckman & Kam, 2011) have found that external validity with regard to student
samples depends on three considerations: (1) the research agenda on which the study
builds (e.g. has prior work already established relationship with student subjects, meaning
incorporating other populations may be more pressing?), (2) the relative generalizability
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of the subjects, compared to the setting, timing, and operationalizations (e.g. a study
using students may have more leeway to control these other dimensions), and (3) the goal
of the study (e.g. to build a theory or to generalize one).
Given these three considerations, the current work seeks to: (1) build on prior
work that utilized multiple samples (e.g. student, non-student, American and nonAmerican) and (2) generalize and build on a theory (i.e. the ideological-conflict
hypothesis). Additionally the current work was able to control the setting of the survey
(online) and the operationalization of variables. Also of importance here is what the study
intends to do. The ideological-conflict hypothesis postulates intolerance on both the left
and right. Thus, to fully ascertain the characteristics ofliberal-based intolerance, a sample
where the respondents are more likely to identify as liberal would be necessary at a basic
level. What is clear though is that political scientists need not be guilty of a "near
obsession" with external validity (McDermott, 2002: 334). Rather when understood fully,
student samples can be a valuable sample body to test theories and hypotheses. Thus,
when used in combination with other sampling bodies, can produce a full picture of the
distinctions being examined.
Once students clicked the link sending them to the survey page, they were
directed that their responses and identities would be confidential, safely secured, and they
could exit the study at any time without penalty. Participants were asked to provide
political intolerance judgments of six random political and social activist groups. These
groups included Focus on the Family, the NRA, American Atheists, Emily's List, the
Socialist Party of America, and the Sierra Club. Unlike previous research, the groups
were not selected with prior knowledge from a predetermined list, but were randomly
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selected from a list containing both liberal and conservative social and political groups.
Research has suggested that individuals who are not open to new experiences express
intolerance against groups who represent new, potentially threatening views (Jost et al.,
2003; Sibley & Duckitt, 2008), as well as those individuals who violate their moral
values (Graham et al., 2009; Wetherell et al., 2013). It can be assumed too that the
absolute number of social groups that conservatives see as potential outgroups would be
higher than it is for liberals. Conversely, given that many groups with conservative values
tend to be larger in terms of population than are social groups with liberal values (e.g.,
Evangelical Christians outnumber atheists/agnostics), liberals may be intolerant toward a
larger absolute number of individuals. In order to validate this "absolute-value"
hypothesis, the political and social groups in this study were chosen at random from a
population of social and political groups without the a priori consideration of their
consistency with liberal or conservative values that was made in prior work. By randomly
choosing the target groups, firmer conclusions can be drawn about the true size and
variability of the ideological-conflict effects in the real world (Fiedler, 2011).
The groups selected for the population sample were similar to those used in
previous research (i.e. Crawford, 2014; Crawford & Pilanski, 2014b), meaning that the
groups chosen for the list corresponded to specific policy areas. Once a list of political
and social groups was composed, six were chosen at random for the intolerance
measures. Political intolerance for each group was assessed with 6-point item scales (1 =
Strongly Disagree; 6= Strongly Agree) for each target. These items were similar to those
used by other researchers (Crawford, 2014; Crawford & Pilanski, 2014b), and derived
from Marcus et al.' s (199 5) political intolerance measure. Items were averaged based on
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the ideology of each group to form the political intolerance measures (a= .89 for liberal
group measure, a= .85 for conservative group measure), which included both positively
and negatively worded items based on extant worded items (see Appendix).
Next, participants provided feeling thermometer ratings for each target (0 =very
cold, 100 = very warm; reverse-scored so that higher scores indicated more prejudice),
which were averaged to form the prejudice measure (a= .83). This measure of prejudice
uses single-item feeling thermometer ratings that capture global affective target
evaluations (Abelson, Kinder, Peters, & Fiske, 1982), but do not necessarily capture the
physical or psychological distancing that often characterizes prejudice (Dovidio, Esses,
Beach, & Gaertner, 2002; Skitka, Bauman, & Sargis, 2005). Therefore, the current study
also utilizes a multi-item measure of social distance (Skitka et al., 2013) as an additional
measure of prejudice. Social distance was measured with three items drawn from Skitka
et al. (2013), each following the stem, "How willing or unwilling would you be to have
someone from each of the following groups ... ?": "come work in the same place as you
do," "marry into your family," and "as a close personal friend." Items were completed on
a 6-point scale (1 =Very unwilling; 6 = Very willing), and were reverse-scored to
indicate greater social distance (a= .91).
Participants then indicated the extent to which they think each group: "violates
your core values and beliefs" (symbolic threat); "takes away societal resources from
people like you" (realistic threat); "makes our society more dangerous and less safe"
(safety threat); and "restrict the personal rights of people like you" (rights threat). These
items were derived from extant measures of these different types of intergroup threats
(Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005; Duckitt, 2006; Gibson & Gouws, 2003; Stephan & Stephan,
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2000), and were measured on 7-point scales (1 =to no extent at all; 7 =to a great extent).
Scores were averaged across the six groups to form four separate threat measures (as =
.82, .79, .83 and .87 for symbolic, realistic, safety, and rights threats respectively).
To set up the political ideology variables, several measures were composed from
extant models of unidimensional and multidimensional ideology. To begin, participants
reported their political ideology on the standard unidimensional model (1 = Extremely
Liberal; ?=Extremely Conservative) and reported party affiliation (1 =Strong Democrat;
?=Strong Republican). Diverging from the standard model, three multidimensional
models were tested. The first, derived from Klar (2014), measures ideology on two
dimensions: social and economic. Respondents answered the following questions:
"Which point on this scale best describes your political views when it comes to social
issues? Issues like same-sex marriage and abortion;" and "which point on this scale best
describes your political views when it comes to economic issues - things like taxes and
the economy?" These were measured on were measured on 7-point scales (1 = Extremely
Liberal; ?=Extremely Conservative). The next model presented 13 policy questions
derived from the American National Election Study. These questions do not exhaust the
totality of policies that might be related to an individual's general belief system, but they
offer a range of politically relevant issues. These policy questions (both social and
economic) were then used to create a policy ideology based on these two policy
preference dimensions. In essence, social liberals are expected to answer social questions
based on social liberalism, economic conservatives are expected to answer economic
questions based on economic conservatism, etc. This measure allowed for ideology to be
measured on what a person believes about important issues, rather than just their reported
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ideology. This is important primarily for the reason that the American public's ideology
is paradoxical: the American public is symbolically conservative, but operationally
liberal (Stimson, 1991, 2004). Thus, Americans are much more likely to identify as
conservatives, even though their policy preferences point to a more liberal outlook. By
utilizing policy questions for a measure of ideology, the true operational nature of the
respondents' belief system can be linked to intolerance judgments. The final measure of
ideology is a novel one. Specifically, if conservatism is so linked to intolerance as the
extant research suggests, a multi-item measure of conservatism is needed. The final
measure utilizes such a measure. Proposed and validated by Everett (2013), the measure
used certain issues specified by conservatives as central to their ideology. Through
extensive validation, the 12-item measure reflects the nature of contemporary
conservatism and measures both economic and social conservatism. Participants
responded on a 0-100 scale with scores tied to intervals of 10 (0, 10, 20 ... 100). Items
measuring "Abortion" and "Welfare Benefits," were reversed scored and then overall
mean scores were computed to form three measures: the 12-item Social and Economic
Conservatism Scale and for its two subscales. Mean values for participants varied from 0
to 100, with higher scores indicating greater political conservatism.
In addition to the three measures of ideology described above, the measures were
manipulated to create non-standard ideologies (e.g. Libertarianism, Communitarianism,
and moderate). By creating these measures, political intolerance can be examined on
more than the left-right spectrum. To do this, Libertarian, Communitarian, and moderate
ideologies were constructed based on the social and economic scales as well as the policy
measures. In all, Libertarians have liberal social views and conservative economic views,
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Communitarians have conservative social views and liberal economic views, and
moderates are between the left-right social and economic scales.
Central to this thesis is the effect that emotion, particularly hatred, has on
intolerance judgments. In addition to hatred, anger and fear were assessed as possible
mediators of intolerance judgments. Participants were asked to indicate how much the
targeted group made them feel the three emotions. Each was measured on four-point
scales (0 =Not at All; 4 =Very). These items concerned group-based hatred (hostility,
hatred; a= .86), anger (a= .84), and fear (afraid, scared, and nervous; a= .81). Lastly,
Participants provided demographic information such as age, gender, race/ethnicity, and
education level. They also completed a political knowledge measure assessing whether
liberals or conservatives supported eight different policies. Correct and incorrect answers
were coded as 1 and 0 respectively, and were summed to form the political knowledge
measure (a =.76). To better model the links between emotion and intolerance, Sequential
Equation Modeling (SEM) will be utilized through SPSS Amos software. The path
analyses will then be analyzed to ascertain the hypothesized links between emotion,
threat, ideology and intolerance. It is important to note that the path analysis conducted
will not determine causal links between the variables. Future work with more
experimental methods will be required to determine causal links. The path analysis will
allow for a better model construction of the hypothesized links between the variables.
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Chapter 4. Hypotheses
Research on political intolerance would suggest that conservatism is more
predictive of political intolerance than liberalism. However, such findings have been
challenged by the ideological-conflict hypothesis. Therefore the hypotheses following are
meant to empirically test the ideological-conflict hypothesis and integrate it with
multidimensional models of ideology and measures of affect. First, recent research has
found inconsistent findings relative to the ideological-conflict hypothesis. Lindner and
Nosek (2009) report that conservatism predicts intolerance judgments and liberalism does
not, while other researchers (Brandt, Reyna, Chambers, Crawford, & Wetherell, 2014;
Chambers, Schlenker, & Collisson, 2013; Crawford, 2014; Crawford & Pilanski, 2014b;
Wetherell, Brandt, & Reyna, 2013) report ideological symmetry in intolerance judgments
and willingness to discriminate. Thus, the weight of recent evidence points toward the
following hypothesis:

H1 : Liberals and conservatives will be equally likely to be intolerant toward
groups with whom they disagree.
Given that there have been no attempts to empirically measure intolerance
judgments in non-unidimensional ideologies (e.g. Libertarianism) or non-specific
ideologies (e.g. moderates), an educated guess is necessary. However, based on the recent
work indicating ideological symmetry (i.e. Brandt, Reyna, Chambers, Crawford, &
Wetherell, 2014), it can be postulated that:
H 2 : Libertarians will not be more intolerant toward outgroups and

Communitarians will not be more intolerant toward outgroups.
H 3 : Moderates will not be more intolerant toward any group.
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Other measures of ideology are expected to follow similar paths as the left-right
ideologies. Given that a respondent's ideology as measured by the policy positions is
more likely to capture their "true" belief system (Treier & Hillygus, 2009) and the
social/economic dimensions of ideology and the 12-item Social and Economic
Conservatism Scale offer additional multidimensionality, it is expected that

H4 : Individuals reporting a liberal ideology based on their policy positions and the
social/economic dimensions of ideology will be intolerant toward groups they
disagree with as will individuals reporting a conservative ideology based on their
policy positions and the social/economic dimensions of ideology.

H5 : Individuals reporting a Libertarian ideology based on their policy positions
and the social/economic dimensions of ideology will not be intolerant toward
outgroups.

H6 : Individuals reporting a Communitarian ideology based on their policy
positions and the social/economic dimensions of ideology will be intolerant
toward outgroups.
H 7 : Individuals scoring high on the SECS will be more likely to display intolerant

judgments than those scoring lower on the SECS.
Aside from measuring political intolerance, two measures of prejudice were used.
One was based on the standard feeling thermometer and the other of a social distance
scale. For the feeling thermometer and social distance measures, ideology has been found
to be a consistent predictor of prejudice (Crawford, 2014). Thus it is expected that:
H 8 : Liberalism and Conservativism will significantly predict prejudice as

measured on a feeling thermometer.
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H 9 : Liberalism and Conservativism will significantly predict prejudice as

measured on by social distance.

H10 : Non-standard ideologies, including Libertarianism, Communitarianism, and
moderates will not significantly predict prejudice as measured on a feeling
thermometer.

H11: Non-standard ideologies, including Libertarianism, Communitarianism, and
moderates will not significantly predict prejudice as measured on by social
distance.
It is expected that emotion and threat will mediate political intolerance levels. It is

well established that perceived threat is the most important predictor of intolerance
(Sullivan et al. 1982). That robust finding is rooted in "realistic group conflict theory"
(Sherif 1966), which shows that incompatible goals and interests (i.e. economic, security,
property) are the main causes of intergroup hostility. Additionally, fear and anger have
been found to have indirect effects on political intolerance (Capelos & Van Troost, 2007;
Gibson & Bingham, 1982; Marcus et al., 1995; Skitka et al., 2004). There is limited
empirical evidence regarding the influence of hatred on intolerance. Only one study
(Halperin, Canetti-Nisim, & Hirsch-Hoefler, 2009) has examined the effects of hatred on
intolerance, and they found that hatred is a strong predictor of intolerance. However, that
study examined hatred during substantial intergroup conflict (i.e. Palestine-Israeli
Conflict) and primed negative memories of the conflict. Given this and the finding that
under stressful conditions emotions become more extreme and, in many cases, their effect
on attitudes and behavior is more central (Huddy, Feldman, & Cassese, 2007, Skitka et
al., 2004), it is expected that:
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H 12 : Hatred will be a significant mediator on intolerance and ideology, with

greater levels of hatred predicting greater levels of intolerance.

H13 : Anger and fear will be significant mediators on intolerance and ideology,
with greater levels of anger and fear predicting greater levels of intolerance.
Finally, it is expected that political knowledge will moderate political intolerance.
It has been found that for intergroup relations, sophisticated individuals tend to use

ideology as the most important basis for their attitudes towards out-groups, emotions
about the out-group were more important among the unsophisticated (Zinni, Mattei, &
Rhodebeck, 1997). Following these theoretical and empirical studies (Luskin, 1987;
Redlawsk & Lau, 2003; Sniderman et al., 1991), it is postulated that:
Hu: Political knowledge will moderate the effect of hatred on political

intolerance, such that greater levels of political knowledge will reduce the levels
of intolerance.
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Chapter 5. Results
To begin, some basic descriptive statistics (Table 1) are necessary to set the scene
for the regression analyses. The survey results were collected via Qualtrics and indicated
a response rate of 13 percent. One factor that may have led to this response rate is that the
survey was moderately long. Research has shown that longer surveys typically have
lower response rates than those of moderate or short surveys (Deutskens, De Ruyter,
Wetzels, & Oosterveld, 2004). The qualitative statistics of the sample indicate that the
overall sample was predominately young, White, senior class females with at least some
college or university education and a party affiliation of Independent to leaning
conservative. For ideology of the participants, 88 identified as liberal, 45 as moderates,
and 61 as conservative. Of the respondents who answered the question, these constitute
the following percentages: 45.4% as liberal, 23.2% as moderate, and 31.4% as
conservative. For the other non-standard ideologies, 34 (13.5%) were found to be
Libertarians and 8 (3.2%) were found to be Communitarians.
Political Ideologies and Intolerance Judgments
In order to ascertain the nature of the relationship between political intolerance,

ideology, threat, and emotion, ordinary least squares regression and path analysis were
conducted. To begin, the results of the OLS regression are displayed in Table 2. First, the
F-statistic indicates the overall significance of the regression equation, and in this case is
found to be statistically significant for right-wing groups. The adjusted R squared value is
displayed and indicates moderately strong relationships.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics
-·----

Mean

Standard Deviation

Minimum

Maximum

Age

25.90

8.71

19

61

Sex

.38

.49

0 =Female

1 =Male

Race

4.70

.82

1 = American Indian

5 =White

Education Level

2.93

1.03

1 =High School Diploma

5 = Graduate Degree

Class Standing

4.03

.89

l =Freshman

5 =Graduate

Party

4.63

2.58

1 = Strong Democrat

7 = Strong Republican

Ideology

3.64

1.63

l = Extremely

7 = Extremely

Liberal

Conservative

Of the predictors examined in the first analysis, several stand out for more
attention. For the unidimensional model of ideology, the results confirm research on the
ideological-conflict hypothesis for right-wing targets, where conservatives are
significantly more tolerant ofright-wing groups and liberals display significantly more
intolerance toward right-wing groups. Diverging from the ideological-conflict hypothesis,
non-standard ideologies perform as expected: Libertarians and Communitarians do not
display significant levels of intolerance toward right-wing groups. Based on the social
and economic dimensions of ideology, social and economic liberals significantly predict
intolerance toward right-wing groups, and social and economic conservatives do not
significantly predict intolerance. This is consistent with the ideological-conflict
hypothesis. Again, moderates do not display intolerant judgments. Of real interest here
are the policy issue ideologies. Although the ideological-conflict hypothesis predicts
liberals would be intolerant ofright-wing groups, when measured by policy issues
liberals do not display such intolerance. While the coefficient is positive, indicating
greater intolerant judgments, it is not significant. The Communitarian variable is also
significant, indicating greater tolerance for right-wing groups. Finally, the SECS measure
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Table 2: Regression Analysis of Political intolerance on Right-Wing Targets
Hypotheses

Variables

b (SE)

Beta

Unidimensional Ideology

Liberal

.76 (.17)***

.30

Moderate

-.06 (.49)

-.03

Conservative

-.77 (.19)***

-.28

Libertarian

-.32 (.24)

-.10

Communitarian

.07 (.49)

.00

Social and Economic Liberal

.47 (.11)***

.29

Social and Economic Conservative

-.63 (.11)***

-.38

Social and Economic Moderate

.03 (.18)

.01

Policy Liberal

.19(.19)

.20

Policy Conservative

-.23 (.05)***

-.49

Policy Moderate

.05 (.17)

.03

Policy Libertarian

-.13 (.19)

-.02

Policy Communitarian

-.28 (.11)**

-.50

SECS

SECS Conservative

-.02 (.01)***

-.29

F-Statistic

29.61 ***

Adjusted R Square

.40

Multidimensional Ideology

Social/Economic Dimensions

Policy Issues Ideology

Standard Errors in Parentheses.* p S .01; ** p S .05; ***p S .001. N = 252. Dependent variable
measured on 6-point item scale (1 =Strongly Disagree; 6= Strongly Agree) for the two conservative
target groups that were averaged to form the political intolerance measure.

is significant and predicts tolerance toward right-wing groups. The next regression
analysis will test the ideology variables on left-wing groups.
The results of the OLS regression on left-wing groups are displayed in Table 3.
First, the F-Statistic is statistically significant for both left-wing groups. The adjusted R
squared value is displayed and indicates that some of the variance in political intolerance
is explained through this regression analysis. From this regression analysis, the
unidimensional model performs as expected: liberals display less intolerance toward leftwing groups compared to their conservative counterparts. For both, the coefficients are
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significant and in the predicted directions. The multidimensional model for the nonstandard ideologies is not significant, indicating no significant predictions in intolerant
judgments. The social and economic dimensions conform to the ideological-conflict
hypothesis: conservatives are more intolerant of left-wing groups than liberals are. The
SECS performs as expected: greater conservatism predicts greater intolerance.
Interestingly, policy issue conservatives are more intolerant toward left-wing targets (in
line with the ideological-conflict hypothesis), but policy issue liberals are not significant
in their tolerance toward left-wing groups. Once again, this is divergent from the
predicted path of the ideological-conflict hypothesis. As in the right-wing analysis, liberal
were not significantly more likely to display greater or less intolerance toward right-wing
or left-wing groups, respectively. Thus, the analyses show different conclusions: the
unidimensional model shows intolerance judgments in line with the ideological-conflict
hypothesis, while the policy issue ideology measure shows greater intolerance among
conservatives, but not liberals for their respective outgroups. This presents an interesting
dilemma for the hypothesis. Does intolerance exist only in unidimensional conceptions of
ideology, but not in multidimensional ones? What explains the fact that what people
describe themselves as politically predicts intolerance, but what they are operationally
does not? It is clear though that the ideological-conflict hypothesis, which seeks to better
integrate current research on intolerance, might not capture the full picture with respect to
intolerance and ideological dimensionality.
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Table 3: Regression Analysis of Political intolerance on Left-Wing Targets
Hypotheses

Variables

b (SE)

Beta

Unidimensional Ideology

Liberal

-.64 (.16)***

-.27

Moderate

.37 (.45)

.06

Conservative

.52 (.18)***

.20

Libertarian

.02 (.22)

.02

Communitarian

.41 (.43)

.10

Social and Economic Liberal

-.53 (.10)***

-.36

Social and Economic Conservative

.25 (.11)**

.16

Social and Economic Moderate

.20(.16)

.09

Policy Liberal

-.13 (.09)

-.19

Policy Conservative

.11 (.05)**

.28

Policy Moderate

.12 (.06)**

.15

Policy Libertarian

.03 (.12)

.02

Policy Communitarian

.11 (.08)

.23

SECS

SECS Conservative

.02 (.01)***

.28

F-Statistic

25.47***

Adjusted R Square

.39

Multidimensional Ideology

Social/Economic Dimensions

Policy Issues Ideology

Standard Errors in Parentheses.* p :S .01; ** p :S .05; ***p :S .001. N = 252. Dependent variable
measured on 6-point item scale (1 =Strongly Disagree; 6= Strongly Agree) for the four liberal target
groups that were averaged to form the political intolerance measure.

Political Ideologies and Prejudice
Aside from the standard measures of intolerance, measures of prejudice also
provide a venue for understanding ideologies' effects on intolerant judgments and beliefs.
There are also two important reasons to include prejudice measures in the analysis. First,
the ideological-conflict hypothesis does not separate prejudice from intolerance even
though each are related, but distinct intergroup phenomena. Prejudice refers to negative
evaluations of or feelings toward particular groups and their individual members (Allport,
1954; Gibson, 2006; Mackie & Smith, 2002; Yzerbyt & Demoulin, 2010). On the other
hand, political intolerance refers to the willingness to deny certain groups democratically-
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guaranteed rights, such as the freedom to assemble, to speak publicly regarding their
beliefs, to run for public office, or to organize in order to influence policy (Sullivan &
Transue, 1999). Thus it is important to examine each separately to truly understand
ideologically-based intolerance and prejudice.
The results of the regression analysis predicting prejudice and social distance on
right-wing targets are presented in Table 4. The model preforms well and predicts a good
amount of variance. Right off, it can clearly be seen that the measures of prejudice
produce contrasting results. The prejudice measure based on feeling thermometers shows
significant predictors of prejudice. Consistent with previous research, ideologically-based
prejudice is observed: liberals are more intolerant ofright-wing groups than their
conservative counterparts. Additionally, the multi-dimensional models show
ideologically-based prejudice for the two standard political ideologies, while moderates
do not predict prejudice. Policy issue-based ideologies also significantly predict
prejudice, with large coefficients in the predicted directions. Communitarians predict
prejudice too, but not as much as the standard ideologies. The social and economic
conservatism scale performs as expected.
Interestingly, the prejudice measure based on social distance is not predicted
based on any of the measured ideologies except for the SECS. Two reasons may be for
these outcomes on social distance. First, the social distance measure was meant to capture
deep-seeded prejudice that is linked to psychological and physical responses through
everyday events (i.e. "would you allow someone who belongs to group X marry into your
family?"). Such questions reach deep into psychological beliefs that only true prejudiced
individuals would feel. As such, it is possible that these individuals would be cautious
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Table 4: Regression Analysis of Prejudice on Right-Wing Targets
Hypotheses

Variables

Prejudice
B (SE)

Beta

Liberal

5.51 (1.25)***

.35

Moderate

.73 (.62)

.05

Conservative

-6.29 (1.29)***

-.38

Libertarian

2.52 (1.01)

.40

Communitarian

-1.43 (.98)

-.12

Social and Economic Liberal

7.53 (1.99)***

.42

Social and Economic Conservative

-3.22 (1.04)**

-.39

Social and Economic Moderate

-2.47 (.88)

-.05

Policy Liberal

9.34 (2.63)***

.39

Policy Conservative

-9.85 (2.66)**

-.47

Policy Moderate

-2.84 (.94)

-.14

Policy Libertarian

3.06 (1.92)

.08

Policy Communitarian

-6.55 (2.50)*

-.36

SECS

SECS Conservative

-1.1 (.17)***

-.46

F-Statistic

29.61 ***

Adjusted R Square

.40

Unidimensional Ideology

Multidimensional Ideology

Social/Economic Dimensions

Policy Issues Ideology

Standard Errors in Parentheses.* p:::: .01; ** p:::: .05; ***p:::: .001. N = 252. Dependent variable
measured by feeling thermometers toward the right-wing groups.

when answering such a question, and that non-prejudicial individuals would answer
according their egalitarian beliefs. Second, the SECS was meant to measure ideological
conservatism based on a set of deeply held beliefs. Based on Based on this and the
analysis by Everett (2013), it is likely that the SECS is capturing the most of the
conservative ideology and as such would significantly predict measures of intolerance
and prejudice.
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Table 5: Regression Analysis of Social Distance on Right-Wing Targets
Hypotheses

Social Distance

Variables
B (SE)

Beta

Liberal

1.10 (.48)

.33

Moderate

-3.85 (.46)

-.05

Conservative

-2.98 (.87)

-.05

Libertarian

.02 (.99)

.02

Communitarian

-2.16 (.87)

-.05

Social and Economic Liberal

1.33 (.54)

.13

Social and Economic Conservative

-3.20 (1.01)

-.24

Social and Economic Moderate

.47 (.69)

.01

Policy Liberal

.89 (.84)

.13

Policy Conservative

-1.29 (.54)

-.33

Policy Moderate

1.70 (.63)

.21

Policy Libertarian

1.55 (.87)

.17

Policy Communitarian

-1.36 (.44)

-.23

SECS

SECS Conservative

-.19 (.05)***

-.40

F-Statistic

20.92***

Adjusted R Square

.47

Unidimensional Ideology

Multidimensional Ideology

Social/Economic Dimensions

Policy Issues Ideology

Standard Errors in Parentheses.* p :-:; .01; ** p :-:; .05; ***p :-:; .001. N = 252. Dependent variable
measured on 6-point item scale (1 =Strongly Disagree; 6= Strongly Agree) for the two conservative
target groups that were averaged to form the social distance measure.

For left-wing targets, the prejudice model based on the feeling thermometers does
not predict as much with regard to ideology as the right-wing model did. However,
several variables stand out. Conservatives are significantly prejudiced of left-wing
groups, while liberals have more favorable attitudes, but this finding is not significant.
Social and economic liberals and conservatives display the predicted levels of prejudice
or lack thereof. Once again, the SECS performs well on both models of prejudice. The
social distance model again is not predicted based on the measured ideologies. From the
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Table 6: Regression Analysis of Prejudice on Left-Wing Target
Hypotheses

Variables

b (SE)

Beta

Unidimensional Ideology

Liberal

-5.09 (2.02)

-.30

Moderate

1.93 (.61)

.13

Conservative

8.87 (1.31)**

.17

Libertarian

3.07 (1.75)

.03

Communitarian

-.60 (.24)

-.00

Social and Economic Liberal

-10.04 (2.45)***

-.26

Social and Economic Conservative

8.31 (1.84)**

.24

Social and Economic Moderate

2.05 (.94)

.14

Policy Liberal

-13.09 (2.60)

-.21

Policy Conservative

6.71 (.86)

.18

Policy Moderate

3.02 (1.27)

.19

Policy Libertarian

1.18 (.95)

.02

Policy Communitarian

6.99 (2.41)

.13

SECS

SECS Conservative

1.62 (.32)***

.35

F-Statistic

15.20***

Adjusted R Square

.44

Multidimensional Ideology

Social/Economic Dimensions

Policy Issues Ideology

Standard Errors in Parentheses.* p ::S .01; ** p ::S .05; ***p ::S .001. N = 252. Dependent variable
measured by feeling thermometers toward the left-wing groups.

prejudice analyses, it can be seen that prejudicial beliefs are ideologically-based, at least
when measured through feeling thermometers. Such measures - e.g. feeling
thermometers - likely capture global affective beliefs and thus are mere attitude measures
rather than the event-based measure of social distance.
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Table 7: Regression Analysis of Social Distance on Left-Wing Target
Hypotheses

Variables

b (SE)

Beta

Unidimensional Ideology

Liberal

-2.54 (.99)

-.30

Moderate

-2.34 (.24)

-.13

Conservative

3.56 (1.02)

.17

Libertarian

-4.20 (l .13)

-.03

Communitarian

1.03 (.76)

.00

Social and Economic Liberal

-2.51 (.82)

-.26

Social and Economic Conservative

4.31 (1.87)

.24

Social and Economic Moderate

-.282 (.71)

-.14

Policy Liberal

-2.39 (1.56)

-.21

Policy Conservative

3.02 (.78)

.18

Policy Moderate

-.57 (.18)

-.19

Policy Libertarian

-1.03 (.52)

-.02

Policy Communitarian

4.32 (1.18)

.13

SECS

SECS Conservative

.38 (.07)***

.35

F-Statistic

15.20***

Adjusted R Square

.44

Multidimensional Ideology

Social/Economic Dimensions

Policy Issues Ideology

Standard Errors in Parentheses.* p :'.S .01; ** p :'.S .05; ***p :'.S .001. N = 252. Dependent variable
measured on 6-point item scale (1 =Strongly Disagree; 6= Strongly Agree) for the four liberal target
groups that were averaged to form the social distance measure.

Does Hatred Predict Political Intolerance?
Now that the relationship between ideology - unidimensional and
multidimensional - intolerance, and prejudice has been examined, it is important to
understand the psychology of those who display such intolerant judgments. It has been
argued in this paper that distinct emotions, particularly negative ones, will play a
significant role to those who display intolerant judgments. As such, several hypotheses
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regarding negative emotions and intolerance were tested through regression and path
analyses.
Table 8 shows the regression analysis for emotion; threat, and control variables
predicting political intolerance. It can easily be seen that of the three distinct, negative
emotions, only one significantly predicts intolerance on right-wing groups. It was
hypothesized that hatred, given its powerful emotional effect, would produce the greatest
predictive power, even above that of threat (previously found to be the most significant
variable in intolerance) (Sullivan et al., 1985). This hypothesis was confirmed by the
analysis. Specifically, the results for right-wing targets shows that hatred is the most
powerful emotional predictor of intolerance, even when controlling for other emotions,
threats, and socio-political variables. It is important to note too that the threat variables do
not significantly predict intolerance. This is stark contrast to the literature on the
antecedents of intolerance. The ideology variable does not significantly predict
intolerance, indicating it is likely influenced by other variables. If the left-wing group
analysis also shows like significance - i.e. hatred is a significant predictors of intolerance
- such findings will have important implications for the overall psychological factors
affecting intolerance. Likewise for left-wing targets, Table 9 shows that hatred is the
most significant predictor of intolerance. The other emotional and threat variables are not
significant. This indicates that hatred, as a psychological and affective process, is a
powerful predictor of intolerance. In all, what these analyses show is that, even after
controlling for other variables found to be significant predictors of intolerance, hatred
emerges as the dominant emotion affecting judgments on intolerance. It is therefore
important to consider hatred as a distinct and powerful emotional precursor to intolerance
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Table 8: Regression Analysis Predicting Political Intolerance on Right-Wing Targets
Hypotheses

Variables

b (SE)

Beta

Emotion

Hatred

.26 (.12)**

.35

Anger

.04 (.12)

.22

Fear

.07 (.08)

.28

Symbolic

.10 (.08)

.31

Realistic

.10(.07)

.09

Rights

.12(.07)

.31

Safety

.09 (.09)

.. 26

Age

-.01 (.01)

-.09

Sex

-.23 (.21)

-.13

Education Level

.01 (.18)

.12

Race

-.13 (.16)

-.07

Ideology

-.05 (.08)

-.34

Threat Perception

Control Variables

F-Statistic

34.37***

Adjusted R Square

.34

Standard Errors in Parentheses.* p :5 .01; ** p :5 .05; ***p :5 .001. N = 252. Dependent variable
measured on 6-point item scale (1 =Strongly Disagree; 6= Strongly Agree) for the two conservative
target groups that were averaged to form the political intolerance measure.

in both liberals and conservatives. It is important to point out too that the nonsignificance of the socio-political variables is at odds with much of the previous research.
This is likely due not to them having no significance in their predictive power on
intolerance, but rather they are qualified by the stronger association between hatred and
intolerance. Such findings correspond with previous works that show that the effect of
socio-political variables on intolerance is frequently mediated by stronger psychological
effects like perceived threat or hatred (Halperin, Canetti-Nisim, & Hirsch-Hoefler, 2009;
Halperin, Canetti-Nisim, & Pedahzur, 2007; Sullivan et al., 1985).
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Table 9: Regression Analysis Predicting Political Intolerance on Left-Wing Targets
Hypotheses

Variables

b (SE)

Beta

Emotion

Hatred

.30 (.11)*

.37

Anger

.05 (.08)

.24

Fear

.04 (.07)

.22

Symbolic

.00 (.04)

.20

Realistic

.01 (.04)

.30

Rights

.02 (.04)

.32

Safety

.03 (.04)

.33

Age

-.00 (.01)

-.04

Sex

-.25 (.19)

-.17

Education Level

.14(.10)

.05

Race

.05 (.13)

.14

Ideology

.04 (.06)

.27

Threat Perception

Control Variables

F-Statistic

36.27***

Adjusted R Square

.36

Standard Errors in Parentheses.* p :<:: .01; ** p :<:: .05; ***p :<:: .001. N = 252. Dependent variable measured on 6-point
item scale (1 =Strongly Disagree; 6= Strongly Agree) for the four liberal target groups that were averaged to form the
political intolerance measure.

Path Analysis: The Mediation of Emotion on Intolerance
Because the influence of hatred and ideology is significantly larger than the
influence of the other potential predictors on intolerance, it can be implied that hatred
mediates the other effects on intolerance. Specifically, the level of hatred mediates threat
perception and anger. Fear and ideology are also postulated to influence levels of
perceived threat. To create such a model, structural equation modeling (i.e. path analysis)
was used. In the model, the variables included hatred as a mediator to threat, anger, fear,
and ideology. Figure 1 displays the model, which had an excellent fit to the data Cx2 = .50;

x2/df < 1; CFI = .97, RMSEA = .002, SRMR = .005). The results show hatred directly
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Fear

.25**

.25**
.39***

.70***

Hatred

.28**

Anger

Figure 1. Path Analysis Model of the Effects ofldeology, Anger, Fear, Threat, and Hatred on Political
Intolerance toward Conservative Groups.
Note: p < .05*, p < .01**, p < .001***; standardized significant coefficients are reported

affects political intolerance (.28) as predicted. The results also show that all the effects of
the other emotion variables - anger (.70 x .28 = .19) and fear (.25 x .39 x .28 = .03)- on
political intolerance are mediated by hatred. While anger and threat directly influence the
level of hatred, fear as well as ideology do so through the mediation of perceived threat.
In other words, anger will tum to political intolerance only if it directly affects hatred. On
the other hand, the process of fear and ideology becoming intolerance is even more
complicated. They have to affect threat perception, which influences the levels of hatred,
which in tum induces levels of intolerance. The path analysis illustrates that hatred is a
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Conservative
Ideology

Fear

~.28***

.23**
Hatred

Threat

.35***

.28***
Anger

Figure 2. Path Analysis Model of the Effects ofldeology, Anger, Fear, Threat, and Hatred on Political
Intolerance toward Liberal Groups.
Note: p < .05*, p <.OJ**, p < .001***; standardized significant coefficients are reported

distinct and significant emotional precursor to intolerance judgments. This significance is
enhanced by the mediation on anger and threat. This is particularly important for threat as
previous studies have found threat to be the most important precursor to intolerance
factors mediating threat significance. This should not be taken as an endorsement of
threat's insignificance on intolerance, but rather evidence of the complex psychological
processes that underline intolerance judgments. In addition, the role of ideology likewise found to be a significant predictor of intolerance in this analysis and the
literature - may not be as direct as once thought. It may not simply be that being
conservative or liberal predicts how one will feel toward outgroups, but rather ideology
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may be a starting point by which other socio-political, emotional, and psychological
factors influence intolerance judgments processes that underline intolerance judgments.
In addition, the role of ideology - likewise found to be a significant predictor of
intolerance in this analysis and the literature - may not be as direct as once thought. It
may not simply be that being conservative or liberal predicts how one will feel toward
outgroups, but rather ideology may be a starting point by which other socio-political,
emotional, and psychological factors influence intolerance judgments
Does Knowledge Mediate Hatred's Effect on Political Intolerance?
The analysis so far has examined the following: ideological dimensionality and
intolerance; emotional antecedents of intolerance; and models predicting the causal path
of emotion, ideology, and threat on intolerance. The final question to be examined in this
chapter is how political knowledge affects intolerance levels. Specifically, does increased
levels of political knowledge or sophistication act as "blocks" to the predicted influencing
variables on intolerance? To test such a question, a regression analysis was performed on
both left and right-wing targets as previously done. The results are presented in Table 10.
What is immediately striking is the lack of significance in all, but one of the
variables. As predicted, political knowledge significantly predicts lower levels of
intolerant judgments. In addition, political knowledge acts as a "block" to every variable.
This indicates that the presence of high levels of sophistication successfully mediates
intolerance. The results are consistent in the left-wing model too: knowledge acts as a
"block" to emotional, threat, and ideological processes, enabling greater tolerance toward
outgroups. The results imply that levels of political intolerance among politically
knowledgeable individuals are less influenced by negative emotions or threats. More
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Table 10: Regression Analysis Predicting Political Intolerance on Right-Wing Targets
Hypotheses

Variables

b (SE)

Beta

Emotion

Hatred

.14(.14)

.30

Anger

.06 (.14)

.06

Fear

.02 (.08)

.06

Knowledge

Political Knowledge

-.25 (.07)***

-.35

Threat Perception

Symbolic

.12 (.10)

.21

Realistic

.04 (.07)

.05

Rights

.18 (.07)

.22

Safety

.11 (.10)

.20

Age

-.04 (16)

-.09

Sex

-.18 (.23)

-.13

Education Level

.16 (.12)

.12

Race

-.04 (.16)

-.07

Ideology

-.17 (.06)

-.29

Control Variables

F-Statistic

29.15***

Adjusted R Square

.40

Standard Errors in Parentheses. * p :S .01; ** p:::: .05; ***p :S .001. N = 252. Dependent variable measured on 6-point
item scale (1 =Strongly Disagree; 6= Strongly Agree) for the two conservative target groups that were averaged to
from the political intolerance measure.

specifically, while anger, hatred, and fear do not significantly affect intolerance at all
among outgroups, hatred has the largest coefficient among the emotional variables. The
results indicate that political sophistication has a large impact on the political processes
involved in intolerant judgments. This is consistent with literature that shows political
processes of decision-making are significantly impacted by knowledge levels (Luskin
1987). What this analysis does not test though is political intolerance among
knowledgeable and non-knowledgeable individuals as two distinct groups. Research has
demonstrated that the sophisticated and non-sophisticated have distinct processes in their
political reasoning (Rahn, 2000; Redlawsk & Lau, 2003). This research has even gone so
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Table 11: Regression Analysis Predicting Political Intolerance on Left-Wing Targets
Hypotheses

Variables

b (SE)

Beta

Emotion

Hatred

.23 (.11)

.20

Anger

.07 (.09)

.11

Fear

.02 (.07)

.07

Knowledge

Political Knowledge

-.29 (.07)***

-.32

Threat Perception

Symbolic

.03 (.05)

.05

Realistic

.03 (.04)

.06

Rights

.00 (.04)

.02

Safety

.00 (.05)

.02

Age

-.00 (.01)

-.04

Sex

-.9 (.23)

-.14

Education Level

.15(.11)

.17

Race

.02 (.16)

.05

Ideology

.12 (.08)

.30

Control Variables

F-Statistic

29.66***

Adjusted R Square

.39

Standard Errors in Parentheses.* p :S .01; ** p :S .05; ***p :S .001. N = 252. Dependent variable measured on 6-point
item scale (1 =Strongly Disagree; 6= Strongly Agree) for the four liberal target groups that were averaged to from the
political intolerance measure.

far as to develop a "sophistication-interaction hypothesis" predicting that less
sophisticated individuals make more frequent use of their emotions in establishing their
political views about issues, groups, and leaders than non-sophisticated individuals
(Sniderman et al., 1991 ). This analysis just examines overall knowledge among
conservatives and liberals and its effect on intolerance. It is likely however that further
analysis will show that, even when separated into two groups, sophistication moderates
the effects of emotion and threat on intolerance judgments.
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Chapter 6. Discussion and Conclusion
Intolerance is still alive and well in contemporary America. In recent years,
America has seen an uptick in intolerant views being displayed in public discourse.
Whether it be the political debate surrounding immigration or the animus toward Muslim
Americans, it is clear that the study of intolerance is likely to continue for some time. In
the social psychology literature, intolerance and its antecedents have been treated with
relative homogeneity. That is, hypotheses, models, and theories trying to explain the
origins of intolerant beliefs have found that intolerance exists primarily asymmetrically.
While other factors have been found to have more predictive power (i.e. threat
perception), ideology has remained one of the stable variables explaining intolerance. In
particular, the extant research, up to the last couple of years, has concluded with
overwhelming evidence that conservatives are much more likely to display intolerance
toward their respective outgroups than liberals are. However, this position has been
challenged. Because of methodological flaws as well as potential biases in research, the
ideological-conflict hypothesis was developed to integrate the new evidence showing that
intolerance is in fact ideologically symmetrical. But other recent work (e.g. Linder and
Nosek, 2009) has continued to find evidence of the "prejudice gap." So which model is
correct in predicting intolerance levels through ideology?
This thesis sought to try to rectify the disagreement between those that support the
extant research on intolerance (e.g. ideological asymmetry) and those that support the
ideological-conflict hypothesis (e.g. ideological symmetry). The results discussed in no
way attempt to solve the disagreement as such a solution is likely unattainable. But what
the results did indicate is that for both the extant research and the ideological-conflict
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hypothesis, new conceptions of ideology as well as other psychological variables in some
ways confirm and challenge the two opposing viewpoints. What should be discussed,
therefore, is how the findings relate to the two views and how the two viewpoints could
be modified to accommodate the new evidence.
The results found in this analysis with respect to ideology and intolerance point to
several things. First among them is that the evidence indicates that the ideological
asymmetry and/or "prejudice gap" found in past research is likely overstated. No
ideological asymmetry was observed in the regression analyses for either left or rightwing targets, even after controlling for other conceptions of ideology. This indicates that
the criticism of the methodological approach taken in past research has merit. The
ideological-conflict hypothesis was tested and confirmed in the analysis, but with a
caveat. The ideological-conflict hypothesis is in need of revision in order to integrate
multidimensional conceptions of ideology. Specifically, when measured on social and
economic dimensions, the ideological symmetry was largely confirmed. But what
emerged is that when ideology is measured by responses to policy issue questions, the
ideological-conflict hypothesis deviates from its predicted hypotheses. While policy issue
conservatives do show greater and less intolerance toward left-wing and right-wing
groups respectively, policy issue liberals are not significant in their respective intolerance
judgments. The coefficients are in the predict directions, but lack any significance
thereby negating their possible predictive power. This finding is possibly the more
damaging for the ideological-conflict hypothesis as the policy issue measure likely
captures "true" ideology. If an ideology is conceptualized as Converse (1964) did - a
type of belief system or configuration of ideas/attitudes that are bound together in a form
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of interdependence - then policy congruency is of importance. If an individual identifies
as a conservative, but policy-wise has liberal preferences which measure is more likely to
capture the nature of ideological beliefs, the standard left-right model based on selfidentification or policy issue measures capturing actual feelings toward real world issues?
It is argued here that the policy issue model is more correct in its conceptualization of

ideology. This is further enhanced by findings from Ellis and Stimson (2009, 2012) that
Americans are symbolically conservative, but operationally liberal, and from Treier and
Hillygus (2009) that American public beliefs are asymmetrical (i.e. conservative on one
dimension, but liberal one the other, or vice versa). If such findings are indeed the correct
way Americans orientate themselves politically, it is likely to mess with studies of
intolerance based on standard ideological measurements. In all, the analysis shows that
while largely correct on a unidimensional level, the ideological-conflict hypothesis likely
needs to be modified to accommodate new multidimensional models of ideology.
Another objective of this thesis was to test emotional hypotheses on intolerance
judgments. It was hypothesized that hatred would be a significant predictor of
intolerance, greater than any other emotional variable. This was confirmed through the
analysis. Additionally, it was found that emotion plays a bigger role than threat
perception does in predicting intolerance. Several implications should be discussed. First,
this analysis is among the first to show that hatred is a powerful predictor of intolerance.
Of the limited research on hatred, nearly all have examined its effects in conflict-ridden
countries (e.g. Israel). This analysis is the first to study its effects in a western country
where intergroup conflict rarely becomes intergroup violence. This analysis also fits in
with the literature as it shows that hatred is stronger than well-established predictors of
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intolerance derived from work on pluralistic intolerance (Sullivan et al., 1982). It has
been found that threat perception is likely to drive people to intolerant judgment (Gibson,
2006), but this analysis shows that hatred is an equal, if not greater, predictor of
intolerance. Yet, hatred is not immune to one important variable: political knowledge. In
line with models on political knowledge (e.g. Sniderman et al., 1991), knowledge acts as
a kind of "block" on intolerance, possibly validating old findings on the role of education
influencing intolerance (McClosky, 1964; Nunn, Crockett, & Williams, 1978; Stouffer,
1955). In fact, McClosky (1964) postulated that "articulates" would be the only ones to
display tolerance toward those they disagreed with as intolerance comes naturally to
humans and as such, is difficult to cultivate the democratic norms tolerance requires. The
political knowledge findings may provide evidence for such an "articulate" hypothesis.
This study has several limitations that must be discussed. First and foremost is the
sample that the hypotheses were tested on. While I defended the use of college students
as an experimental sample, there is no denying that much of the social sciences is wary of
using college students as experimental samples. As such, for those concerned with
generalizability performing the analyses on multiple samples of diverse demographic
variables would qualify the findings found in this thesis. Second, the conceptualization of
ideology, intolerance, and prejudice is a debatable topic in social and political
psychology. There is no one standard measure for ideology (even the very meaning of
what an ideology is constitutes a debatable topic), prejudice, or intolerance, but each have
the most-commonly used measures. As such, future research might discover new
dimensions and factors underlining ideology that are not available today. Thus, findings
have to be taken with an inherent caution as new models could either validate or
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undermine the findings partially or in totality. Future research could also further explore
the nature of hate on intolerance through more enhanced conceptualizations of hate and
more experimental designs. For example, recent research (i.e. Halperin, Canetti, &
Kimhi, 2012) has found that hatred comes in two varieties: immediate and chronic. Each
has distinct characteristics, origins, and effects that likely differ in their influence on
intolerance. It is likely also that to test such varieties of hate, in-lab experiments would
have to be done as surveys would likely have trouble picking up the distinct effects each
would possibly have. In all, studies on intolerance as well as its precursors and
antecedents are not going to phase out anytime soon. Since Stouffer's (1955) classic
study, social psychologists have been fascinated with the origins and effects of
intolerance in pluralistic societies. Given the lively debate raging in political psychology
now over the nature of ideology and intolerance, such works examining them will not
only grow, but will be necessary to finally ascertain what defines us politically and how
good people can make intolerant judgments.
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Appendix: Coding Charts

Gender Variable
Male

1

Female

0

Age Variable

Continuous

Race Variable
American Indian/Alaskan Native

1

Asian/Pacific Islander

2

Black/African American

3

Hispanic/Latino

4

White/Caucasian

5

Recoded Race Variable for Regressions
White/Caucasian

1

Other

0
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Highest Level of Education Variable
High School Diploma

0

Some College/No Degree

1

Associate or Technical Degree

2

Bachelor's Degree

3

Graduate/Professional Degree

4

Current Class Standing Variable
Freshman

0

Sophomore

1

Junior

2

Senior

3

Graduate/Professional

4

Party Identification Variable
Strong Democrat

0

Weak Democrat

1

Independent Leaning Democrat

2

Independent

3

Independent Leaning Republican

4

Weak Republican

5

Strong Republican

6
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Political Ideology Variable
Extremely Liberal

0

Liberal

1

Slightly Liberal

2

Moderate

3

Slightly Conservative

4

Conservative

5

Extremely Conservative

6

Social Ideology Variable
Extremely Liberal

0

Liberal

1

Slightly Liberal

2

Moderate

3

Slightly Conservative

4

Conservative

5

Extremely Conservative

6

65

Economic Ideology Variable
Extremely Liberal

0

Liberal

1

Slightly Liberal

2

Moderate

3

Slightly Conservative

4

Conservative

5

Extremely Conservative

6

Political Intolerance Variables
Strongly Disagree

0

Disagree

1

Somewhat Disagree

2

Somewhat Agree

3

Agree

4

Strongly Agree

5
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Political Intolerance Questions
"I think that members of Emily's List, a Pro-Choice organization, should be
allowed to distribute pro-choice pamphlets and buttons on local college
campuses."
"I believe that members of Focus on the Family, an organization that
opposes gay marriage, should not be allowed to organize in order to pass
laws banning gay marriage."
"I believe that the NRA, a pro-gun rights group, should be allowed to hold a
rally in support of more lenient gun laws."
"I think that American Atheists should not be allowed to organize in order
to remove the phrase "Under God" from the Pledge of Allegiance."
"I believe that members of the Sierra Club, a pro-environmental group,
should not be allowed to organize in order to influence government policy
on global climate change."
"I believe that members of the Socialist Party should not be allowed to teach
in public schools and universities."

Social and Economic Conservatism Scale
Issue

Dimension

Abortion

Social

Limited Government

Economic

Military & National Security

Social

Religion

Social

Welfare Benefits

Economic

Gun Ownership

Economic

Traditional Marriage

Social

Traditional Values

Social

Fiscal Responsibility

Economic

Business

Economic

The Family Unit

Social

Patriotism

Social

PositivelyWorded
NegativelyWorded
PositivelyWorded
NegativelyWorded
NegativelyWorded
NegativelyWorded

67

Social Policy Issue Questions
Variable

Question

Gay Adoption

"Do you think gay or lesbian
couples, in other words,
homosexual couples, should
be legally permitted to adopt
children?"
"Do you favor, oppose, or
neither favor nor oppose
requiring companies with a
history of discrimination to
increase the number of
minority workers through
affirmative action
programs?"
"Which one of the choices
best agrees with your view
regarding abortion?"

Affirmative Action

Abortion

Coding
O=Yes
1 =No

0 =Favor

1 =Neither Favor/Oppose
2 =Oppose

0 =Never Permitted
1 =Only for Rape/Incest
2 = Only If Need Is Clear
3 = Always Permitted

Gays in Armed Forces

Gun Control

Death Penalty

"Do you think homosexuals
should be allowed to serve in
the United States Armed
Forces or do you not think
so?"
"Do you think the federal
government should make it
MORE DIFFICULT for
people to buy a gun than it is
now, make it EASIER for
people to buy a gun, or
KEEP THESE RULES
ABOUT THE SAME as they
are now?"
"Do you FAVOR or
OPPOSE the death penalty
for persons convicted of
murder?"

0 = Should Be Allowed
1 = Should Not Be Allowed

0 = Make It More Difficult
1 = Keep the Rules the Same
2 = Make It Easier

0 =Favor
1 =Oppose
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Economic Policy Issue Scale Questions
--

Variable

Coding

Government Services

1. The government should provide many fewer services
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7. The government should provide many more services
1. The United States should have a government health insurance
plan
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7. The United States should have a private health insurance plan
1. Tougher regulations on business are needed to protect the
environment
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7. Regulations to protect the environment are already too much a
burden on business
1. The government should see to it that every person has a job
and a good standard of living
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7. The government should just let each person get ahead on their
own

Healthcare

Environment

Standard of Living
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Other Economic Policy Issue Questions
Variable

Question

Public School Funding

"Should federal spending on
public schools be
INCREASED,
DECREASED, or KEPT
ABOUT THE SAME?''

Welfare Spending

"Do you favor, oppose, or
neither favor nor oppose
requiring companies with a
history of discrimination to
increase the number of
minority workers through
affirmative action
programs?"
Social Security Spending "Which one of the choices
best agrees with your view
regarding abortion?"

Coding
0 = Increased
1 = Kept about the same
2 = Decreased
0 = Increased

1 = Kept about the same
2 = Decreased

0 = Increased
1 = Kept about the same
2 = Decreased

Emotion Variables: "Please indicate how much Group X makes you feel each
emotion ... "
Very
0
Somewhat

1

Not Very

2

Not at All

3
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Threat Variables: "Please indicate the extent to which you think the following
groups ... "
To a Great Extent
0
Somewhat

1

Very Little

2

Not at All

3

Social Distance Variables: "Please indicate how willing or unwilling you would be to
have someone from each of the following groups ... "
To a Great Extent
0
Somewhat

1

Very Little

2

Not at All

3

Political Knowledge Variable: "Please indicate whether liberals or conservatives
support the following policies ... "
Correct Answer
O=No
1 =Yes

Variables Measured on Feeling thermometers:
Prejudice toward Six Groups
Social and Economic Conservatism Scale

0-100
0-100
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